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 Abstract 
 Th is article recasts our understanding of the forms autonomy may take. Rather than emphasizing a 
rigid set of deﬁ nitions, the article argues that autonomy forms can be characterized by the aggregate 
number of issues controlled by the local community (scope), the level of local control over any 
given issue (depth) and the territorial insularity of the autonomous community. So characterized, 
autonomies run the gambit from personal to cultural to functional to administrative to legislative. 
Of course, there are grey areas between these types of autonomy and some agreements may fall 
somewhere in between. Th e article also further breaks legislative autonomy into strong and weak 
forms. 
 Keywords 
 Autonomy, minority, personal autonomy, cultural autonomy, functional autonomy, administrative 
autonomy, legislative autonomy 
 1. Introduction 
 Th is article examines the characteristics of various forms of autonomy. Th e forms 
of autonomy analyzed by this article include personal autonomy, cultural auton-
omy, functional and administrative autonomy and legislative autonomy. 1 Th e 
article argues that existing discussions of autonomy are too rigid in their applica-
tion, leading to forced deﬁ nitions or the exclusion from autonomy discussions of 
certain sorts of autonomy. 
 *) Th e author would like to thank the following for their valuable assistance in reviewing this 
manuscript: Farimah Daftary, Bryanna Gartner, Ted Robert Gurr, André Légaré and Markku Suksi. 
Th e author, of course, remains responsible for any errors contained herein. Th e author would also 
like to acknowledge the ﬁ nancial support of the Department of Law of Åbo Akademi University, 
the Foundation of Åbo Akademi University, the Carnegie Corporation of New York and Stephen F. 
Austin State University. Finally, the author would like to reserve special thanks for the ﬁ nancial and 
moral support of Gösta von Wendt. 
 1)  Th e article avoids the term “political autonomy”, though its use is widespread. Participants at the 
set of conferences culminating in this volume noted the vague and inconsistent use of this term. 
Similarly, “territorial autonomy” suﬀ ers from varied usages. It has the additional problem of exclud-
ing otherwise extremely developed forms of autonomy. Th e deﬁ nitional distinction should include 
a territorial element, but should also include depth and scope of autonomy. Th us geospatial speci-
ﬁ city is relevant, but not determinative. 
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 Th e article begins with a short discussion of the existing deﬁ nitions of, and 
distinctions among, forms of autonomy. Th e article goes on to assert a revised set 
of autonomy forms. Th e article then examines this new typology in some detail, 
arguing that forms of autonomy can be distinguished on three axes: the scope or 
aggregate number of issues controlled by the autonomous entity along one axis; 
the depth of control the entity is granted (or in some cases seizes) along the 
 second axis; and the relationship of the autonomy to spatial or geographic notions 
along a third axis. An autonomy that includes a large number of aggregate issues 
(scope), along with a great deal of control held by the autonomous region (depth), 
and existing in a distinct and insular territory would be considered more  extensive 
than one that did not. Th e article does not argue that previous understandings, 
which focused on competencies on the basis of devolved or legislative powers, 
and/or level of entrenchment, are irrelevant. Rather, the article argues that these 
pre-existing distinctions ﬁ t into, and are a part of, the revised understanding. 
So there are additional factors, including pre-existing factors, which ultimately 
help to clarify the form of autonomy at issue. 2 
 2. Existing Understanding of Autonomy 
 Our existing understanding of forms of autonomy owes a great deal to ground-
breaking scholars such as Hurst Hannum, Ruth Lapidoth, Markku Suksi and 
Yash Ghai. 3 Hannum provides one of the ﬁ rst legalistic analyses of autonomy. 
Such scholars distinguished between at least four, and possibly more, types of 
autonomy. Th ese include,  inter alia , personal, cultural, administrative and terri-
torial autonomy. Lapidoth collapses personal and cultural autonomy, deﬁ ning 
this joint autonomy as one that “applies to all members of a certain linguistic or 
cultural community which are, however, not resident within a particular territory 
(for example, the Roma/Gypsies in Finland)”. 4 More recently, however, others 
have viewed these two autonomies as distinct. Personal autonomy then is the 
 2)  Th ere are, of course, many alternative typologies for understanding forms of autonomy. For 
example, one might classify autonomies according to beneﬁ ciaries of autonomy, according to the 
purpose of the autonomy ( e.g ., conﬂ ict resolution, protecting a speciﬁ c identity, transition to inde-
pendence), whether autonomy was negotiated “top-down” or “bottom-up”. I am grateful to Farimah 
Daftary for this point. Th is article takes a legalistic approach. 
 3)   See generally H. Hannum,  Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: Th e Accommodation of 
Conﬂ icting Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1990); R. Lapidoth,  Autonomy: 
Flexible Solutions to Intrastate Conﬂ ict (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1997); 
M. Suksi (ed.),  Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer Law International, Th e Hague, 
1998); and Y. Ghai (ed.),  Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
 4)  J. Loughlin and F. Daftary,  Insular Regions and European Integration: Corsica and the Aland Islands 
Compared ,  European Centre for Minority Issues #5, November 1999, p. 26. 
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 5)  M. Suksi, ‘Functional Autonomy: Th e Case of Finland with Some Notes on the Basis of Inter-
national Human Rights Law and Comparisons with Other Cases’, in this issue, pp. 196 and 197, 
citing A. Eide, ‘Cultural Autonomy: Concept, Content, History and Role in the World Order’, in 
Suksi,  supra note 3. 
 6)  M. Suksi, ‘Concluding Remarks’, in Suksi,  supra note 3, p. 360. 
 7)  Th ere are, of course, exceptions to this typology. One could imagine an autonomy with a large 
number of issues, great depth of control over those issues, but lacking territorial insularity and 
distinctiveness. Still, in most cases I argue that greater scope and depth of control will be accompa-
nied by greater territorial insularity and distinctiveness (a clearly deﬁ ned territory that beneﬁ ts from 
autonomy but exists some distance from the central state). 
guarantee of certain basic rights to the individual, and not necessarily in the 
 individual’s capacity as a member of a distinct group. Such rights might include 
the American political notions of civil liberties and civil rights. For example, 
Suksi notes that personal autonomy “implies, ﬁ rst and foremost, the use of the 
freedom of association as a general civil right in the horizontal dimension between 
persons belonging to a minority group for carrying out diﬀ erent cultural and 
other activities that the minority might feel are important”. 5 Th e right, though it 
beneﬁ ts minorities, beneﬁ ts all groups and does not ﬁ nd its origin or end point 
in any particular minority group. A separate administrative structure is lacking, 
as well as a deﬁ ned territory. 
 Cultural autonomy diﬀ ers from personal autonomy in that  by design and in 
purpose it extends rights to a particular cultural or linguistic group, such as the 
Sami in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia (only some of these countries grant 
cultural autonomy to the Samis). Typically, there is some regulatory power inher-
ent here. Cultural autonomy is community-based in nature, rather than extend-
ing to all members of a society as individual or personal autonomy. 6 
 Functional, administrative and political autonomy are all interchangeably used 
in the literature. One of the purposes of this set of articles is to help to clarify and 
better deﬁ ne autonomy, and thus distinctions and clariﬁ cations are important 
here. Th is article argues that all autonomies exist on a spectrum, each entailing 
greater institutional and perhaps even philosophical coherence. Th e article elimi-
nates political autonomy and distinguishes between functional and administra-
tive autonomy. Functional autonomy implies the decentralization of control over 
a single functional subject matter in a semi-distinct geographic space – such as 
allowing two sets of language-diﬀ erentiated schools in a single school district. Th e 
geographic space for this functional autonomy is set within a school district, but 
within that school district the subjects of the autonomy may have little or no ter-
ritorial continuity. In contrast, administrative autonomy implies a set of func-
tional autonomies (such as schools, public services and courts with specialized 
adaptations to beneﬁ t a select group) all coexisting in the same geographic space, 
probably presupposing greater territorial distinctiveness, though not reaching the 
level one typically sees in legislative autonomy (see below). 7 In administrative 
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autonomy the set of functional autonomies may be linked by some overarching 
purpose, even some unifying philosophical principle. 
 Administrative autonomy has typically been diﬀ erentiated from legislative 
autonomy by the scope and depth of powers transferred. Administrative  autonomy 
includes limited regulatory powers, but no legislative power. Th is article argues 
that functional and administrative autonomy also lack the distinctive geographic 
space present in most legislative arrangements, in addition to the greater scope 
and depth of legislative autonomy. In practice, there is some grey area between 
administrative and legislative autonomy (and all autonomies). Th us, in all dis-
tinctions drawn herein, we are discussing diﬀ erences of degree at some point. 
Th is is noted in Figure 1 by the broken lines separating the autonomies. Corsica 
then might fall into a grey area between administrative and legislative autonomy, 
though most would argue it is more fully administrative than legislative in nature. 
So while Corsica has a regional assembly and the ability to consult on national 
laws, this ability is non-binding in nature. In the larger sense, we see all autono-
mies existing on a spectrum with ever increasing scope and depth of autonomy as 
we move from personal autonomy through to cultural, functional, administrative 
and legislative autonomy. 
 Th e ﬁ nal type of autonomy is called legislative autonomy. Scholars such as 
Hannum and Lapidoth insist that territorial autonomy includes a local legislature 
with constitutionally or otherwise deeply entrenched powers. For what Hannum 
Figure 1. Forms of Autonomy.
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 8)  Hannum,  supra note 3, pp. 458–466. 
 9)  Th e distinction between “tiers” of territorial autonomy will be discussed herein below. 
 10)  Suksi,  supra note 6, p. 361. 
dubs “full autonomy” (what this article refers to as legislative autonomy) he 
demands a “locally elected legislative body with some independent legislative 
authority”, “a locally selected chief executive” and “an independent local  judiciary” 
focused on particular areas of local competence. 8 Th is deﬁ nition may be unneces-
sarily rigid especially given this article’s argument that autonomy is inherently 
ﬂ exible and should be deﬁ ned in a similar fashion. So then the gap between 
administrative autonomy and legislative autonomy should really be a matter of 
slow transformation or degree. It is the scope and depth of local rights and powers 
that matter, and not whether a single attribute such as a locally elected chief 
executive exists. Th ough clearly a local legislature mitigates strongly in favour of 
deﬁ ning an autonomy as territorial, this article argues that standing alone a local 
legislature really represents less than legislative autonomy. Th e right to pass local 
laws, implicit in legislative autonomy, also requires enforceability and a broad 
spectrum of local rights to truly rise to the level of legislative autonomy. A legis-
lature may be argued to be a  necessary condition, but not a suﬃ  cient condition 
for legislative autonomy to exist. 
 Th ere are many autonomies that are entrenched in the sense of traditions, 
 customs and norms which may not meet the rigid standard set forth by Hannum 
and others (the Isle of Man, for example). Th is article later argues that there exists 
a weak and strong from of legislative autonomy, again at opposite ends of 
a  spectrum. Th ough no legislative autonomy ﬁ ts cleanly into a weak or strong 
classiﬁ cation (just as few autonomies can meet all of the requirements of Hannum’s 
more rigid deﬁ nition), we can identify autonomies as tending toward weak or 
strong. So a legislative autonomy existing in a distinct and insular geographic 
space, deeply entrenched, with an independent legislature having a wide range of 
competencies, its own court system and the unfettered ability to tax and spend 
would be considered a relatively strong legislative autonomy. Th e Isle of Man and 
the Faroe Islands come closest to meeting these speciﬁ cations among the cases 
reviewed here. An autonomy lacking some of these points, but still having a dis-
tinct insular territory and a legislature (and probably a few other non-tier one 
attributes) would be  considered a relatively weak legislative autonomy. 9 So then 
in contrast to strong autonomies, Nunavut and the Azore Islands represent weaker 
legislative autonomies.  
 It is important to remember that one of autonomy’s greatest strengths is its 
adaptability, and thus attempts at hard legal deﬁ nitions are not only unlikely to 
succeed, but are also probably unwise inasmuch as such a deﬁ nition could limit 
the applicability of autonomy. As Suksi reminds us, “the content of autonomy 
will vary according to the speciﬁ c needs in each case”. 10 Not only is autonomy 
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 11)   See generally Suksi,  supra note 5. 
 12)   Miranda v.  Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
adaptable in its applicability, it can also prove malleable over time in the event of 
changing circumstances. Th is characteristic too is reﬂ ective of a non-rigid 
approach to autonomy. Th e case studies examined by others in this volume 
 demonstrate the value of ﬂ exibility in our understanding of autonomy. 
 Th is article next examines the various forms of autonomy in detail. Again, the 
key distinctions between and among autonomies are the scope or aggregate num-
ber of issues over which the local region has been granted control; the depth of 
control exerted by the locals; and the insularity and territorial distinctiveness of 
the geographic region at issue. When one multiplies the number of issues con-
trolled by the depth of local control over each issue by the insularity/ distinctiveness 
of territory, one ﬁ nds a measure of the volume of autonomy.
 Scope X Depth X Territorial Distinctiveness = Volume of Autonomy 
 Th e volume is least signiﬁ cant in personal autonomy. Indeed, if an individual 
does not have such basic human rights, we might even not be surprised to see 
abuse of the individual. As one moves toward a greater number of issues con-
trolled, greater depth of control by the locals and greater territorial insularity/
distinctiveness, the volume of local autonomy increases, culminating in what 
could be a great deal of local control such as in the Faroe Islands. If one pushes 
much beyond the Faroes’ state of aﬀ airs, the situation begins to imply full 
 sovereignty. Th is article next examines personal autonomy. 
 3. Personal Autonomy 
 Personal autonomy implies basic human rights in the areas of civil rights and civil 
liberties. Per Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, these include,  inter alia , linguistic, religious, cultural and other rights. 
When combined, and when fully granted, these rights grant the individual the 
opportunity to engage society and other individuals within society in the manner 
of personal choice. Personal autonomy may also include the right to use one’s 
language before state authorities. What is typically lacking, however, is a separate 
administrative structure. 11 In this regard, the United States is instructive. An indi-
vidual who is accused of a crime by the police must be granted his “Miranda 
rights” in an understandable form. So there are times when an interpreter (includ-
ing sign language) must be brought to the accused. Incriminating statements 
made by the individual before he or she could understand his or her rights are 
typically not admissible in criminal proceedings. 12 
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 13)  Suksi,  supra note 5, p. 196, quoting Eide,  supra note 5, p. 252. 
 14)  Suksi,  supra note 6, p. 359. 
 15)  M. Suksi,  On the Constitutional Features of Estonia (Åbo Akademis tryckeri, Åbo, 1999) p. 43. 
 16)   Ibid ., p. 47. 
 4. Cultural Autonomy 
 Cultural autonomy diﬀ ers from personal autonomy in that rights are granted to 
individuals on the basis of their membership in a particular group. A greater 
number of deﬁ ned rights are granted to the minority group, rather than simply a 
guarantee that the minority will be able to exercise rights the entire population 
has in personal autonomy. Th ere is also typically some sort of minimalist legal 
structure to the set of rights granted. So it may be that some representative body 
exists, though without decision-making abilities, outside the group in question 
and with a limited set of areas in which it can make decisions or rules. Quoting 
Asbjørn Eide, Suksi understands cultural autonomy “as the ‘right to self-rule, by 
a culturally deﬁ ned group, in regard to matters which aﬀ ect the maintenance and 
reproduction of its culture’”. 13 Here, the state chooses  not to impose its authority 
over the minority group on a select set of issues. Cultural autonomies are “non-
territorial in the sense that their jurisdiction concerning certain subject-matters 
covers the territory of the whole state”. 14 
 Two cases, that of the Sami in Finland, and that of minorities in Estonia, are 
instructive. Th e Sami in Finland have certain cultural areas set aside for limited 
self-rule. Th eir language, culture and educational systems are all protected in 
lesser or greater degrees (though most clearly in a territorially delineated area in 
the northern most part of Finland). Language rights are guaranteed by statute, 
and cultural rights are as well. Education may be received in the Sami language. 
Th ese rights are important for the continued survival of the Sami culture, but in 
no way provide for the sort of administrative order found in the more extensive 
forms of autonomy. 
 Estonia also provides for cultural autonomy, though there are concerns about 
the rights of Russians in Estonia. Estonia passed a 1993 law, entitled the Act on 
Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities, which, when combined with certain 
constitutional provisions and the Estonian Language Act of 1995 (as amended in 
January 1999), creates a degree of cultural autonomy for minorities within 
Estonia. Estonian law appears to reject dual citizenship for Russians. Th is distinc-
tion arises out of the manner in which Estonia had its independence denied by 
the Soviet Union and the continuing view within Estonia that Russians present a 
threat to Estonia’s “ethnic character”. 15 But for national minorities with Estonian 
citizenship only, Estonian law oﬀ ers a range of cultural autonomy, “such as the 
right to preserve one’s ethnic identity”. 16 “Th e aim of this arrangement is to make 
possible for national minorities to provide education in their own language, to 
use their freedom of expression in their own language, and to practice their own 
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 17)   Ibid. , p. 48. 
 18)   Ibid . 
 19)   Ibid. , p. 49. 
 20)   Ibid . 
culture and traditions”. 17 Language issues are especially pertinent for minority 
culture and rights. Estonia provides that, where the language spoken by most of 
an area’s population is not Estonian, “minority languages may also be used in 
dealings with the state and local government authorities”. 18 Th is includes the use 
of a minority language in legal proceedings. Moreover, “educational institutions 
established for ethic minorities shall choose their own language of instruction”. 19 
Most importantly, it appears that these language rights extend to the Russian 
population, whatever their other rights as a minority. 20 
 Like the rights of the Sami in Finland, most national minorities in Estonia, 
including Russians to at least some extent, enjoy protection of their language. 
Educational and other cultural rights are extended to other national minorities. 
But for both the Sami in Finland and for national minorities in Estonia a broader 
type of autonomy is not currently forthcoming. Some of these minorities, such as 
the Sami in Finland and Russians in Estonia, do occupy a comparatively distinct 
territory. But for diﬀ erent reasons neither has managed to acquire greater auton-
omy. Th e autonomies provided them lack the aggregate number of issues as well 
as the depth and scope of autonomous rights provided in the functional and 
administrative realms. For other minorities in Estonia, even were they to assert 
the full spectrum of autonomous possibilities, they would not acquire their own 
administrative structures or the other attributes of more the detailed autonomies. 
Still,  de jure cultural rights that either have been acquired, or could be acquired, 
do begin to approach the grey area between cultural autonomy and functional 
autonomy as described below. 
 5. Functional and Administrative Autonomy 
 Th is article divides what many call administrative autonomy into two classes: 
functional and administrative. As indicated above, like the other types of auton-
omy herein, each of these types is viewed as more developed than the previous, 
and thus typically encompassing a greater volume of autonomy. Th is article ﬁ rst 
examines functional autonomy. 
 Functional autonomy is argued to extend only to one area of subject matter, or 
perhaps to a few areas that are otherwise unconnected. So one could imagine 
autonomy over the area of education, the church or perhaps language. But as the 
number of areas rises increasingly some overarching autonomy begins to take 
form, one this article identiﬁ es as administrative autonomy. Th e autonomy 
 M. Tkacik / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 15 (2008) 369–401 377
 21)  It should be noted that phrases such as “a more extensive form” of autonomy or a “less extensive 
form of autonomy” are not intended as a normative judgment. Rather, less extensive forms of 
autonomy grant a reduced “volume of autonomy” (as noted on page 374 herein) while a more 
extensive form of autonomy simply refers to one that has a greater volume of autonomy. 
 22)  Th is is not to imply that six per cent is a magic number. Rather, when combined with Finland’s 
relatively liberal political system and tolerant population, six per cent allows the Swedish-speakers 
to make themselves felt politically. I am indebted to Farimah Daftary for pointing out that far larger 
minorities are often denied autonomy in less accommodating states. 
 23)  Suksi views this as personal rather than functional. It is my view that given the related adminis-
trative structure this is functional autonomy. 
Finland provides its Swedish-speaking mainland minority would be functional 
were it limited to only a few areas. But as it exists this autonomy seems to merge 
into administrative  autonomy. Still, it is useful to examine the areas of compe-
tence provided here. 
 Th e Swedes in Finland, while not in a territorially distinct area (except for 
Åland), do tend to concentrate in the south and west of the country. Greater 
geographic deﬁ nition and insularity could move this autonomy toward a more 
extensive form, while lesser deﬁ nition and insularity would imply a less extensive 
form. 21 Th e example of the Swedish-speakers in Finland ﬁ ts well somewhere on 
the functional/administrative spectrum. Similarly, the Swedish-speaking minor-
ity is large enough to make its demands felt politically (about six per cent of 
Finland’s population). 22 
 Th e Constitution of Finland recognizes the right of its population to receive 
services in another tongue. It recognizes two national languages (Finnish and 
Swedish) and provides individuals the right to use their language in courts and 
before other authorities. Th e principal Act of Parliament implementing this con-
stitutional pledge is the Language Act (423/2003). Both languages must be 
 provided for in bilingual municipalities. In fact, the language regime extends to 
road signs, courts and other areas of state administration. Th e single area of 
 language rights then extends into assorted areas of society, thereby evidencing 
both greater scope and depth than a single functional area might imply (such as 
the right to propagate one’s culture). Th ere is a national requirement that state 
bureaucrats know both languages when working in a bilingual jurisdiction. Still, 
even as deeply into the society as these rights extend, one might still be tempted 
to call this functional or perhaps personal autonomy only. 23 But the Finnish 
example goes further. 
 Another area of functional autonomy provided by Finland to Swedish-speakers 
is in the area of education. Educational autonomy has been characterized as both 
vertical and horizontal, evidencing greater scope and depth than might otherwise 
be the case in other functional autonomies. Here, horizontal autonomy exists 
across Swedish-speaking and bilingual school districts. Vertical autonomy is pres-
ent because autonomy ranges from the day care and pre-kindergarten up to and 
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 24)  Suksi,  supra note 5, pp. 201–203. 
 25)   Ibid ., pp. 202 and 203 (footnote omitted). 
 26)  On problems,  see ibid ., pp. 213–215. 
including the university level. Relevant law and regulations include the Basic 
Education Act (628/1998), the High School Act (629/1998), the University Act 
(645/1997) and the Decree on Competence Requirements for Personnel in the 
Field of Education (986/1998). Th is last law has its equivalent in the Act on the 
Knowledge of Languages Required of Personnel in Public Bodies (424/2003). 24 
Th is extensive regulatory framework seems to augur in favour of some overarch-
ing autonomous scheme. Th is is especially the case because not only is there great 
depth in the number of laws covering education, but also wide scope in that both 
government personnel and educational personnel are regulated in a similar fash-
ion. Th e language laws, taken together, mean “that the public schools, run by the 
municipalities, are either unilingual Finnish-speaking or unilingual Swedish-
speaking not only in unilingual municipalities but also in bilingual municipalities”. 25 
In fact, Swedish-language education, paid for by the government, is available 
from day care through to the university level. Separate schools exist in bilingual 
municipalities. Typically, in bilingual districts this means separate administration 
for each language school or school boards divided into two sections. Th is lan-
guage division is maintained all the way up to the National Board of Education. 
Of course, these administrative bodies have increasing rule-making authority as 
one moves toward the national level. Th is decision-making power, when com-
bined with multiple functional areas of autonomy, seems to in total create some-
thing more than the sum of its parts. Moreover, like language, education permeates 
society, thus tending toward evidence of more than simple functional autonomy. 
Th e commitment to provide language in a minority’s tongue arguably evidences 
a broader commitment than simple functional autonomy. Th us this functional 
autonomy arguably nears administrative autonomy. Beyond language and educa-
tion, functional autonomy is also provided in other areas. 
 Th e Finnish judicial system provides imperfect yet signiﬁ cant autonomy for 
Swedish-speakers. Th e majority of courts, of course, are Finnish-speaking, but 
both individual Swedish-speaking courts exist as do bilingual courts. In fact, 
a party to legal proceedings in Finland has a right in any civil or criminal matter 
to avail himself of either the Swedish or Finnish language. Beyond the judicial 
area, healthcare is to be oﬀ ered in both Finnish and Swedish. In both of these last 
areas, diﬃ  culties have been encountered, but the commitment to providing 
 services to the Swedish minority is demonstrated across a wide swath of issue 
areas, both horizontally and vertically. 26 It should also be noted that in the area of 
the administration of private forests, a Swedish forest centre has been provided 
for. Th e scope and depth of autonomy when taken as a whole seems signiﬁ cant. 
Yet, there are still additional areas of ‘functional’ autonomy provided in Finland. 
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 27)   See generally Suksi,  supra note 5. 
 Although the idea of a democracy with a state-sponsored church is diﬃ  cult for 
the average American to comprehend, Finland, in fact, has just such an arrange-
ment (along with many other European countries). Consequently,  administration 
of the Evangelic-Lutheran Church must take language and other population dif-
ferences into account. Th e Evangelic-Lutheran Church therefore maintains sepa-
rate language churches at the local level but adheres to the Language Act nationally. 
But territorial jurisdiction in this case is not exclusive, therefore demonstrating a 
key diﬀ erence with more extensive forms of autonomy. 27 
 In and of themselves each of these areas provides evidence of functional auton-
omy. Each is more or less inclusive in its area, but alone would not extend beyond 
functional autonomy. However, when one views the number of aggregate issues 
over which autonomy is provided, and when one examines the scope and depth 
of autonomy in those areas, one begins to wonder whether this is not something 
more than functional autonomy. Additionally, when one combines these areas 
one sees an overarching commitment on behalf of the Finnish government, 
backed by laws, regulations and institutions across the board, that together indi-
cate a broad commitment to autonomy that implies more than simply functional 
autonomy. Th is then appears to be administrative autonomy. One criticism of 
this view is that what we are really witnessing here is linguistic autonomy in many 
diﬀ erent variants. If this is the case, then one might argue that this is simply func-
tional (or, in Suksi’s view, personal) linguistic autonomy. But it seems that because 
language carries over into so many areas that it is not a single functional issue. 
Rather, language itself is one of the unifying themes that links various functional 
autonomies and helps them become administrative in nature. 
 Th e autonomy granted by Finland has application at the local, district and 
national level. In the Finnish case, the state provides not just  de jure rights but  de 
facto rights as well. Th is arguably provides greater depth to these rights (as does 
their international character), which mitigates in favour of recognizing this 
autonomy as administrative rather than simply functional. As Suksi discusses on 
this issue, Finland’s decisions regarding its Swedish-speakers help bring Finland 
within the purview (as well as philosophical spirit) of the UN Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁ c and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Convention Against Discrimination in Education and 
various European norms and conventions as well. One might go further and 
argue that the underlying philosophical spirit of Finland’s actions demonstrates a 
coherence to this administrative autonomy not necessarily found in functional 
autonomy. 
 Functional autonomy then typically covers only a few ‘functional’ or applied 
issue areas (schools as opposed to symbols). It is characterized by a limited 
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 28)  For the 1991 Special Statute,  see Act no. 91-428 of 13 May 1991, on the Statute of the Territorial 
Unit of Corsica ( Loi no. 91-428 du 13 mai 1991 portant statut de la collectivité territoriale de Corse ), 
in Journal Oﬃ  ciel , 14 May 1991, available at <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=13568764& 
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 31)   Ibid ., p. 307. 
 aggregate number of issues (limited scope), by limited depth within these issues 
and exists in a geographic space that is less distinct and insular than in the more 
 extensive autonomies. 
 Whether one characterizes the rights of Swedish-speakers in Finland as highly 
developed functional autonomy or immature administrative autonomy, it seems 
this is a form of autonomy that exists in the grey areas between the types of 
autonomy set forth herein. Corsica’s autonomy, however, falls clearly into the 
administrative type. Corsica provides more local control across a spectrum of 
issues than does the autonomy provided for Swedish-speakers on mainland 
Finland. First, Corsica is both territorially more distinct and more insular than 
the regions inhabited by the Swedish-speakers (except for Åland, of course). 
Second, the Corsicans have control over a greater aggregate number of issues than 
do the Swedish-speakers. Th ird, in those issue areas, the Corsicans typically have 
greater depth of control. For example, although the mainland Swedish-speakers 
have decision-making powers through school boards and perhaps in a few other 
areas, the decision-making powers devolved to Corsica are greater. Moreover, 
Corsica has an elected regional assembly with limited regulatory powers. 
 Th is Regional Assembly of Corsica has the power to make certain decisions 
and regulations. Its powers are derived ﬁ rst from the 1991 Special Statute (as 
modiﬁ ed by the law of January 2002). 28 Th ese powers were reaﬃ  rmed in Article 
72 of the French Constitution and include a limited right to dissent from the 
central French Parliament (though this right has not been invoked). Th ese Article 
72 powers are, of course, available to all mainland French regions. Th e Assembly 
may “derogate on an experimental basis for limited purposes and duration from 
provisions laid down by statute or regulation governing the exercise of their 
powers”. 29 Th e Assembly was earlier granted the power to adapt national decrees 
on the basis of the 1991 Statute and reaﬃ  rmed in 2002 by statute. 30 Th is power 
has been exercised regularly. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 72-1 added in 
2003,  non-binding local referenda can be organized in Corsica, as in other French 
regions. Since 1991 “the (non-binding) opinion of the Corsican Assembly must 
be sought on proposed changes to the island’s status”. 31 Th is is a lesser power than 
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 34)   Ibid ., p. 285 (footnote 64). 
 35)  F. Daftary, ‘Corsica’s Experiences with Autonomy: Lessons Learned’, unpublished manuscript 
from October 2006, p. 12. 
the right to organize a referendum, which is quite radical in the French context. 
Additionally, pursuant to the 1991 Special Statute, the centre must consult with 
the Corsican Assembly if “draft laws or decrees” will aﬀ ect Corsica. Th e Assembly 
is elected by the people of Corsica (universal suﬀ rage) to six-year terms in a two-
round, proportional election with a ﬁ ve per cent minimum threshold in the sec-
ond round of elections. In comparison to the Swedish-speakers’ decision-making 
capacity on mainland Finland, it is clear that Corsica has been granted greater 
authority, though the non-binding character of most of the Assembly’s activities 
would appear to make this less than legislative autonomy. 32 Th e question is 
whether it has such a large aggregate number of powers, with such scope and 
depth, that one should consider it legislative rather than administrative auton-
omy. Had the reforms proposed in 2000 been fully implemented, granting the 
Corsican Assembly a more signiﬁ cant right to derogate from national laws with-
out the need to request prior permission from the French Parliament, then argu-
ably Corsica might have crossed the blurry line separating administrative from 
legislative autonomy. 33 
 Corsica also has a local Executive Council created by the 1991 Statute. Th e 
Council has six councillors (selected from the Assembly) and a president that 
implements Assembly policies. Th e local Executive Council, of course, has no 
more power than the Assembly with which it works. Th ere is also a representative 
of the central government present in Corsica. Th e Prefect is “a political/admin-
istrative instrument to ensure respect of public order and to facilitate dialogue 
with the centre”. 34 Given the inability of the Assembly to impose its will on the 
centre, the real question about the depth of powers granted is what competencies 
have been transferred to Corsica. 
 Th e Corsican Assembly has no legislative power, but instead “regulatory  powers 
to implement national laws and decrees as well as to deﬁ ne and implement poli-
cies within expanded spheres of competence (education, media, training, culture, 
the environment, regional planning, agriculture, tourism, ﬁ scal matters, housing, 
transportation, energy, etc.)”. 35 Th e competencies transferred are not insigniﬁ -
cant. Th ey represent a large aggregate number, across a scope of issues, and pre-
sumably allow for regulation in some depth on these issues. It is true that Corsica 
is not going to implement policies directly at odds with French national policy, 
but it is also true that Corsica appears to have some latitude in the implementa-
tion of policy. In keeping with the French view of ‘the indivisibility of the Republic 
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and the equality of all citizens before the law’, Corsica has generally not been 
allowed to develop ‘asymmetric solutions’. Nor have ‘collective rights’ been 
granted to a particular segment of the French population; hence there are no 
rights to unique symbols such as ﬂ ags in Corsica. 36 Th at said, the Assembly has 
been granted the right to adopt programmes for teaching the Corsican language 
and culture. 37 
 Still, the centre retains powers enough to make clear that Corsica has not been 
granted any sort of legislative autonomy, notwithstanding its distinct culture and 
insular geography. Th e centre remains “responsible for national interests, admin-
istrative supervision, and the observance of the law”. 38 It retains control over the 
local government through a comprehensive and overlapping administrative 
regime. Th e centre controls internal security, the judicial system, foreign rela-
tions, social policy and most other issues. 39 Nevertheless, there are areas in which 
the periphery has managed to wrest limited control from the centre. 
 Corsica has an increased control over ﬁ scal aﬀ airs since the beginning of the 
autonomy process in the 1980s. Th ese rights have their origin both in the 1991 
Special Statute and additional provisions from the 2002 law. Article 72-2 was later 
added to the Constitution (2003) to reaﬃ  rm some of these rights for all French 
regions. Constitutionally, laws may be passed by which tax revenues are provided 
to the periphery. Moreover, to the extent duties are delegated to the region, so too 
should the corresponding revenues. 40 By statute, local tobacco and alcohol reve-
nues now go directly to Corsica, as do certain transportation taxes. But no other 
local taxes may be levied. Still, the Regional Assembly does adopt a budget. Th ere 
are additional ﬁ scal beneﬁ ts for the island. Corsica is a tax free zone for employ-
ment taxes. Fiscally then Corsica is a mixed bag. It does not have the sort of ﬁ scal 
independence one expects in legislative autonomy. But it does have more ﬁ scal 
authority than less extensive forms of cultural and functional autonomy. 41 
 Another example of greater local powers, one that actually hints at legislative 
autonomy, is local representation at the centre. Corsica is guaranteed four depu-
ties at the National Assembly. It also elects two senators. Typically no such power 
can be granted unless there is at least some territorial distinctiveness to a region 
( i.e , a territorially deﬁ ned election district). Th e Swedish-speakers in Finland 
(excluding Åland) do not have such a guarantee, but Corsica does, indicating that 
Corsica has a more developed degree of autonomy. 
 Th e question of entrenchment is also a mixed bag in Corsica. On the one 
hand, its rights derive from Article 72 of the French Constitution. On the other 
 M. Tkacik / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 15 (2008) 369–401 383
 42)   Ibid . 
 43)  However, there exists a Swedish Assembly of Finland (<www.folktinget.ﬁ /en/index.html>) 
which is basing its activities on the Act on the Swedish Assembly of Finland (1331/2003). According 
to Section 1(3) of the Act, the Assembly fulﬁ ls its tasks by presenting proposals, submitting  opinions 
and by providing information. 
 44)  Some might argue that the Swedish-speakers actually have functional autonomy and not admin-
istrative autonomy, clarifying the distinctions with Corsica. 
 45)  My decisions regarding placement of issues in tiers is somewhat subjective, of course. Th e actual 
allocation of issues among tiers will vary according to the particular case. Farimah Daftary notes in 
some cases, such as Albanians in Macedonia, and Hungarians in both Romania and Slovakia, that 
education may be a tier one issue rather than a tier two issue. Symbols can also be tier one issues in 
some cases. 
hand, the 1991 Statute and the 2002 law amending it are ordinary laws subject 
to revision or even rejection by a simple majority vote at the National Assembly. 42 
On entrenchment then the autonomy seems on par with that of Swedish-speakers 
in Finland. 
 Taken as a whole it appears that Corsica has a more developed autonomy 
regime than that of the Swedish-speakers in mainland Finland. It is true that the 
depth of autonomy for Swedish-speakers seems greater in the area of education 
and language. But when one examines the overall scope of autonomy, Corsica has 
a far broader regime than the Swedish-speakers. In particular, the Swedish-
speakers do not have an especially geographically deﬁ ned or insular home area 
(except for the Ålanders); they have no representative assembly with decision-
making powers; 43 and they have no independent access to revenues nor any abil-
ity to spend such revenues even if they were available. It thus appears that Corsica 
has a more extensive form of administrative autonomy than the Swedish-speakers 
in mainland Finland. 44 Of course, administrative autonomy is far less developed 
than even the most basic legislative autonomy. 
 6. Legislative Autonomy 
 6.1. General 
 Th e cases analyzed in this volume include many more cases of legislative auton-
omy than any other autonomy. Consequently, this section will depart from the 
format of the previous sections as follows: Th is section will discuss groups of 
agreements according to issue area. Th e article will examine four tiers of auton-
omy issues, the ﬁ rst being the most important for quasi-independent legislative 
autonomy, and each successive area being less important than the last. Th us, in 
addition to aggregate issue areas, and in addition to the depth of autonomy, the 
higher tiers are more important to autonomy and therefore where  present add 
more to the overall volume of autonomy in any given case. 45 Th e complete absence 
of tier one issues probably precludes characterizing an autonomy as legislative. 
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 6.2. Tier One Issues 
 Tier one issues are central to legislative autonomy, including such fundamental 
questions as the character of the territory in question, the local legislature, the 
local executive, central participation in local aﬀ airs, the local judicial system, lan-
guage issues, local consultation on local participation in the central legislature, 
entrenchment and dispute settlement. Each of these issues can be arrayed on a 
scale ranging from less local control to greater local control. So not only do more 
of these issues indicate a greater level of autonomy, but greater local control 
(greater depth) also indicates greater autonomy. Th e highest levels of legislative 
autonomy will include the greatest aggregate number of these issues as well as the 
greatest depth among these issues. 
 Th e ﬁ rst set of tier one issues examines how distinct the territory at issue is and 
how insular it is from the centre’s territory. Among the cases of legislative auton-
omy examined in this volume, one typically sees especially distinct and insular 
territories, especially when compared to non-legislative cases. Th e Faroe Islands, 
the Isle of Man, the Azore Islands and the Åland Islands are, of course, all islands 
and therefore by deﬁ nition particularly distinct and insular. But even the other 
case of territorial autonomy, Nunavut, is also quite distinct and insular. Th ough 
not an island region, it is in the north of Canada, geographically well deﬁ ned and 
insular because of the region’s inhospitable weather,  geographic isolation and 
remoteness from the central markets of southern Canada. Our examples of non-
legislative autonomy often also display territorial distinctiveness and insularity in 
comparison to most regions of the world, yet sometimes do not reach the level of 
distinctiveness/insularity present among the legislative examples. So, while 
Corsica is an island region, it is less insular than perhaps the Azores, the Faroes 
and the Isle of Man. Similarly, while the Swedish-speakers on the Finnish main-
land, the Sami and Russians in Estonia live in more territorially distinct areas 
than most people, these areas are not as insular as many of our legislative auton-
omy examples. Of course, this is only one  variable in determining legislative 
autonomy. 
 A key variable in determining the existence of legislative autonomy and 
 emphasized by most scholars is the level of independence of the local legislature. 
Note that the level of independence of a local legislature is diﬀ erent from the 
areas over which it has competence (these will be discussed below). Th ere is a 
great deal of diversity regarding the local legislatures’ independence among our 
legislative autonomy cases. Even before the acts of 2005, the Faroes’ government 
held “legislative … powers over ﬁ elds of responsibility within its purview”, 46 but 
the acts of 2005 granted the Faroese authorities full control over all areas not 
 46)  Act no. 11 of 31 March 1948 on the Home Government of the Faroes, Section 4. 
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 51)   Ibid ., Articles 228 and 231. 
 52)   Ibid ., Article 233. 
 53)   Ibid ., Article 234. 
 54)   Ibid ., Article 167(1). 
explicitly retained by Danish authorities, who in fact retained very little  control. 47 
Similarly, the Isle of Man’s legislature, the Court of Tynwald, has a great deal of 
control over local matters. It is true that laws passed by the Court of Tynwald 
must seek Royal Assent or United Kingdom approval, but such approval is sel-
dom withheld. And because of the lack of a written constitution in the United 
Kingdom, the norms, conventions and practices built up over the years imply 
that a constitutional expectation has arisen of protecting the Isle of Man’s legisla-
tion. Th at said, if the Court of Tynwald were to go too far and attempt to deny 
human rights or some similar fundamental right, most believe Royal Assent 
would be withheld. 48 And again, similarly, the Åland Islands’ parliament, while 
technically subject to dissolution by Finland’s president, is unlikely to be dis-
solved. And in the unlikely case that Åland’s parliament was dissolved, elections 
are then legally mandated by the 1993 Act. Th e president of Finland does retain 
the right to veto legislation if Åland exceeds its legislative mandate, but this basic 
example of separation of powers is to be expected. 49 So the Faroes, the Isle of Man 
and Åland all retain extensive local control over the local legislature. 
 Th e Azores has perhaps less developed local control, but still maintains a healthy 
degree of independence for its local legislature. In the case of the Azores, a local 
Legislative Assembly is provided for that may draft administrative and political 
statutes, subject to approval from the Assembly of the Republic (the centre). 50 
Other legislation may be passed by the local Legislative Assembly if it covers an 
area delegated by the centre. 51 Th is legislation over delegated areas is not subject 
to approval by the Assembly of the Republic, though such legislation is subject to 
veto. Th e Legislative Assembly may override this veto by “an absolute majority of 
all its members in full exercise of their oﬃ  ce”. 52 Dissolution of the Legislative 
Assembly is a possibility, to be followed by elections. 53 Th e Legislative Assembly 
also has the right to “initiate laws with respect to the  autonomous” region. 54 
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 Nunavut has a local decision-making body with less local control than those 
above, though still not insigniﬁ cant control. Th e Legislative Assembly for Nunavut 
is an elected assembly entitled to make laws in a number of prescribed areas. 55 But 
the representative of the centre, the Governor in Council, may “disallow any law 
made by the Legislature or any provision of any such law at any time within one 
year of its enactment”. 56 Th e Governor in Council has not asserted this right since 
1978 in the Yukon. So by political convention, the Governor in Council ( i.e. , 
the federal cabinet) hardly ever uses its veto power to strike down territorial laws. 
 Corsica probably has the least developed assembly of all the legislative autono-
mies reviewed here. 57 Indeed, Corsica lacks a local legislature and instead main-
tains a regional assembly. Th is Assembly has only limited regulatory powers. Th e 
central government is not required to consult the Local Assembly even on matters 
that will aﬀ ect Corsica, though “it  may be consulted by the French Prime Minister 
on draft laws or decrees which directly aﬀ ect the Island”. 58 Hence, all the legisla-
tive autonomies examined have some form of regional assembly, though the 
“depth” of local control varies. Th e local executive is similar. 
 Th is article next distinguishes between the “local executive”, and the local 
 government. For purposes of this article, the local executive refers to the indi-
vidual executive oﬃ  cial who acts as a local governor, key executive oﬃ  cial or 
other individual in whom executive powers, either formal or ceremonial, vest. 
Th e “local government”, on the other hand, refers to the executive branch of 
government, that branch charged with executing local laws. Many agreements 
divide control over these two entities, with the local executive actually owing at 
least some degree of allegiance to the centre, while the local government owes 
allegiance to the local legislature. 
 Th e most developed local executive (or perhaps the weakest representative of 
the centre in an autonomous region) exists in the Faroes. As with its local legisla-
ture, the Faroes have seen an increase in the depth of local control over executive 
powers with the enactment of the 2005 laws. Prior to this, when the 1948 Home 
Act governed, the Faroes were granted local executive powers only over its areas 
of competence. 59 As noted above, more recent law grants the Faroes executive 
powers in all matters except those speciﬁ cally retained by the centre. 60 Th is is 
signiﬁ cant because it means that the locals will control all areas not speciﬁ cally 
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retained by the centre, instead of only those areas speciﬁ cally granted to the locals. 
Th e Faroes are also subject to a High Commissioner, who acts with executive 
powers on behalf of Denmark. But this High Commissioner holds only  ex oﬃ  cio 
powers on the Faroes. 61 So the Faroes (along with the Azores and the Åland 
Islands) eﬀ ectively have two “competing” executives present on the islands. 62 
Th e Azores arguably have the next most “local-centric” executive. Th e Portuguese 
Constitution provides that the autonomous regions (including the Azores) will 
have the power to “exercise their own executive power”. 63 At the same time, in the 
Azores the executive “shall be a Representative of the Republic whom the President 
of the Republic shall appoint and discharge from oﬃ  ce after ﬁ rst consulting the 
Government”. 64 It is unclear whether this means consulting with the regional 
government or the central government. Nor is it clear that consulting requires 
approval by those consulted. But it is clear that this individual represents the cen-
tre, and not local interests. Th e Azores then seem also to have taken a middle road 
where they eﬀ ectively have two executive authorities, one with the duty to execute 
local law, and the other with the duty to represent the centre. 
 Åland has an individual executive who represents the centre (the Governor) 
and an executive branch (the government) that acts on behalf of the Legislative 
Assembly of the Åland Islands. As noted above, it is common to have the indi-
vidual executive represent the national government, as opposed to acting as an 
agent of the local government. Yet even here Åland has more control than most 
territorial autonomies in that Åland is to be consulted in the selection of the 
Governor. Nevertheless, the “Governor shall represent the Government of Finland 
in Åland” 65 though the Governor is appointed in agreement with the Åland 
Parliament Speaker. 66 
 On the Isle of Man, the local executive is the Lieutenant Governor who repre-
sents the Queen (that is, the central United Kingdom government). 67 But as 
noted above, the norms and conventions that have developed around the Isle of 
Man imply that the Lieutenant Governor, while having great power over local 
legislation through the requirement of Royal Assent, is seldom in a position to 
exercise those powers. On the other hand, the Isle of Man has no input into the 
selection of the Lieutenant Governor, unlike the situation of the Åland Islands. 
 Finally, in Nunavut, a Commissioner represents the centre. Th e Commissioner 
of Nunavut is appointed by the Governor in Council. 68 Th e Commissioner acts on 
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behalf of the Governor in Council, and therefore the centre. 69 Th e Commissioner 
appoints an Executive Council on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly 
of Nunavut. 70 In the end though, the role of the Commissioner can be best com-
prehended as a ceremonial role. In Nunavut, the real power is held by the  territorial 
Executive Council – the Cabinet. As such, the Commissioner’s role can best be 
compared to the Lieutenant Governor’s role in the Isle of Man. 
 Although the autonomous regions’  chief executive oﬃ  cial is not always beholden 
to local interests, it may still be that the  local government , the branch that executes 
law, does in fact primarily serve local interests. In Åland, the government “shall be 
appointed as provided by an Act of Åland”, 71 thus an indication of local control. 
Th e government of Åland has a right to issue decrees “on matters within the 
 powers of Åland”. 72 Th e Isle of Man has a local government, though the Queen’s 
representative is present in the person of the Lieutenant Governor. 73 In the Faroe 
Islands, a Home Government is provided for. 74 Th e Azores have a right to a 
“Regional Government” as well as to a Legislative Assembly. 75 Th is Regional 
Government “shall be politically responsible to the Legislative Assembly” though 
“the Representative of the Republic shall appoint its president in light of the 
results of the regional elections”. 76 Moreover, the President of the Republic shall 
appoint the other “members of the Regional Government upon the proposal of 
its president”. 77 So once again it is not entirely clear where the government’s loyal-
ties lie. Th is is not a problem when parties are in agreement of course, but it may 
be a problem when disputes arise. 78 Finally, in Nunavut, as noted above, an 
Executive Council is provided for. 
 In addition to a legislature and executive, self-rule would seem to imply control 
over the local judiciary. 79 Here, however, central authorities have been more reluc-
tant to relinquish control. Th e reasons for this reluctance may be that the centre 
fears locally controlled courts may not enforce certain laws, or it may simply be 
that the judicial system is structurally less amenable to local control. Th e judiciary, 
after all, depends upon certain fundamental laws that do not vary over a state’s ter-
ritory (even if some local law may vary). Alternatively, it may be that structurally it 
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is not possible to give judicial control to the periphery. For example, judges may be 
appointed throughout the country by a central authority, and to allow locals the 
power of appointment could raise constitutional and certainly signiﬁ cant political 
issues. Whatever the reasons, we see far less devolution of judicial powers. In many 
cases these powers are not mentioned, or where they are, the centre explicitly 
retains authority (Åland). Both the Faroes and the Isle of Man, however, are granted 
some judicial control. Faroese authorities are granted the right to establish courts 
with “jurisdiction over all matters and ﬁ elds of responsibility in the Faroes”. 80 Th e 
Isle of Man “constitutes a separate legal jurisdiction, with its own laws”. 81 Nunavut 
has a more limited ability to control the local judiciary. Its Assembly is empowered 
to make laws concerning “the administration of justice in Nunavut, including the 
constitution, maintenance and organization of territorial courts, both of civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, and the procedure in civil matters of those courts”. 82 However, 
the centrally controlled Governor in Council appoints judges. 83 Beyond this, the 
autonomous regions are not given control over the judiciary. 
 Language can also be of vital importance to an autonomous region if its popu-
lation speaks a diﬀ erent language from the centre. Language rights are provided 
to three of the legislative autonomies studied here: the Åland Islands, the Faroes 
and Nunavut. Th is recognition of language rights represents both a greater scope 
and depth to these autonomies. In Åland, the legal local language is Swedish, 
though the right to speak Finnish is guaranteed, and translations to Finnish are 
always made available before the handful of state authorities that have jurisdiction 
on the Åland Islands. Swedish is spoken in schools and before public authorities 
of the Åland government. 84 In the Faroes, “Faroese is recognized as the principal 
language, but Danish shall be taught well and carefully, and Danish may be used 
as well as Faroese in public aﬀ airs”. 85 Th is then is quite diﬀ erent from the treat-
ment of Finnish in Åland. Translations shall also be made available in the Faroes. 
In the Nunavut Territory, language is perhaps slightly less controlled by the locals. 
According to the Canadian Constitution English and French are oﬃ  cial languages 
in the territories and cannot be diminished. However, in addition to English and 
French, territorial language laws have also given Inuktitut (the local language) 
oﬃ  cial status to be preserved, promoted and used. 86 In other autonomous regions, 
either the central government will not extend oﬃ  cial status to the local language 
(Corsica) or there is no local language that needs preserving (Azores). 
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 Another tier one issue central to determining ﬁ rst whether legislative auton-
omy is present, and second whether it is of the strong or weak sort, is the level of 
local participation in central aﬀ airs. One way for a local region to protect its 
interests is through involvement in central aﬀ airs. Th e easiest way to achieve local 
involvement is by granting the locals input into central legislation that will aﬀ ect 
the local region. While the Isle of Man does not have a right to involve itself in 
UK aﬀ airs per se, through the course of norms, customs, and conventions, there 
has developed a “practice not to legislate for the Islands without their consent on 
matters which are of purely domestic concern to them”. 87 In Åland, the centre 
must seek local opinion on matters aﬀ ecting Åland. 88 On the one hand, the 
requirement of this opinion is explicit, though it is not binding, and thus the depth 
of this right may actually be less than the depth of the Isle of Man right. On the 
other hand, Åland has the right to submit initiatives for consideration by Finland’s 
Parliament. 89 Moreover, the Åland delegation, charged with deciding certain joint 
ﬁ scal questions, has both Ålandic and mainland-Finnish membership. 90 Similarly, 
the Azores are guaranteed a right of non-binding consultation as well as the right 
to initiate such discussions. 91 In the Faroe Islands, non-binding consultations are 
also required. 92 
 Another way to ensure that a local voice is heard in the centre is to grant the 
locals representation in the central parliament. In this regard, the Faroes are guar-
anteed two members in the Danish lower house and one member in the upper 
house. 93 One seat is reserved for the Ålanders in Finland’s Parliament pursuant to 
Finland’s Constitution. 94 Registered Corsican voters elect four deputies and two 
senators to the French Parliament. In the Canadian House of Commons (lower 
house), Nunavut voters elect one representative (member of parliament). Nunavut 
is also entitled to have one seat in the Senate (upper house). Th e Governor in 
Council nominates senators for life. Th ese powers are more easily granted in the 
situation of a distinctive and insular territory. 
 Th e ﬁ nal tier one issue area is that of entrenchment. Entrenchment refers to 
the level of ease or diﬃ  culty with which the centre can change the autonomous 
arrangements. Th is notion is easily translated into the concept of lesser or greater 
local control as used by this article. Th e greater the level of entrenchment, the 
greater the depth of the autonomy. Although in other aspects the Nunavut 
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 autonomy sometimes provides less local control than other legislative autono-
mies, it could be argued that through Article 4 of the Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement (NLCA) its  autonomy is entrenched at the constitutional level. Th e 
NLCA (of 1993) is entrenched and protected under Section 35 of the Canadian 
Constitution. 95 Th erefore, any changes to the provisions of the NLCA, which 
include Article 4, require both Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. and Canadian central 
government approval. 96 In contrast, the Nunavut Agreement of 1993 is statutory 
in nature. 97 Although the 1993 Act on the Autonomy of Åland is not formally a 
constitutional act, it requires a two-thirds vote of both the local and central legis-
latures, eﬀ ectively giving it the same or even better durability as a constitutional 
provision. 98 Moreover, the Constitution of Finland refers to Åland’s autonomy in 
at least two diﬀ erent places. 99 Th e Isle of Man again presents an interesting issue 
because of the lack of a written constitution for the United Kingdom. But on the 
basis of well-recognized norms, conventions and customs, it can be argued that 
the autonomy of the Isle of Man is as ﬁ rmly entrenched as any of the above 
autonomies. Th e level of entrenchment in the Azores is covered by Article 288 of 
the Portuguese Constitution. “Th is section deals with ‘limits to the revision on 
the substance’ by elevating a number of fundamental principles, such as the polit-
ical and administrative autonomy of the archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira, 
to a level which laws revising the Constitution must safeguard”. 100 Th us a semi-
constitutional protection exists for some principles of the autonomous region. 
Th e legislative initiative in certain areas is also placed in the hands of the autono-
mous region, not the centre, thus providing another layer of protection. Th e pro-
tection does not, however, rise to the level it might. As Suksi notes, the “Portuguese 
Constitution does not, however, entrench the autonomy of the Azores and 
Madeira by way of requiring the consent of their respective legislative assemblies 
before constitutional amendments take place”. 101 Other areas, such as the Faroes 
and Corsica, have little or no entrenchment. It has been noted that the autono-
mous positions of both of these areas are regulated only “in legislation enacted in 
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the manner prescribed for ordinary law”. 102 Th ese autonomies can be changed or 
even abrogated by ordinary law. 103 
 Suksi argues that in the end true autonomy should ﬁ nd its origin on the consti-
tutional plane so as to protect the arrangement from central legislators. 104 However, 
one might consider the possibility that a long history of norms and customs 
respecting autonomy may evolve into eﬀ ectively, if not explicitly, “near constitu-
tional” protection. For example, both the Isle of Man and the Faroe Islands have 
such a long history of autonomy that it is diﬃ  cult to imagine this autonomy being 
swept away, except perhaps in the face of profound incompetence on the part of 
local authorities (by legislating in violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, for example). Suksi contrasts constitutional means of entrench-
ment with entrenchment on the international legal plane. Here, once such rights 
to self-determination are granted to a minority, the “state is under an obligation 
not to worsen or abolish them”. 105 If it is the case, as many commentators argue, 
that international law is increasingly relevant to our world of globalization and 
permeable sovereignty, then we should expect the international legal protections to 
become increasingly pertinent in the 21st century (see tier three issues below). 106 
 Th e ﬁ nal tier one issue is dispute settlement. Th e agreements reviewed reveal 
dispute settlement mechanisms in the cases of the Azores, the Faroes, the Åland 
Islands and the Isle of Man. Th e Azores have the most local control over dispute 
settlement. As noted earlier, a veto by the Representative of the Republic can 
be overridden by an absolute majority of all members of the (local) Legislative 
Assembly. 107 Of course, ultimately, the President of the Republic has the ultimate 
power of dissolving the Legislative Assembly and the Regional Government in 
the Azores. 108 Regarding the Faroes, the ﬁ nal arbiter of disputes is a panel made 
up of “two members appointed by the Danish Government and two appointed 
by the Faroese Government and three Supreme Court Judges appointed by the 
president of the Supreme Court”. 109 Th e Supreme Court judges do not vote if all 
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four of the other members agree on the dispute resolution. If, however, there is 
disagreement among the four, the Supreme Court judges alone decide the matter. 
In the Åland Islands the national Supreme Court is the ﬁ nal legal authority advis-
ing the President on the exercise of the veto. 110 As for the Isle of Man, dispute 
settlement clearly rests with the courts of the United Kingdom’s Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. 111 
 Th ese tier one issues are important for determining the scope (aggregate num-
ber of issues), signiﬁ cance (by deﬁ nition, tier one issues are among the most 
important), and depth of an autonomy. An autonomy with multiple tier one 
areas and relatively greater local control implies a strong legislative autonomy. An 
autonomy with fewer tier one issues with less local control implies a weaker leg-
islative autonomy or even a non-legislative form of autonomy. Th is approach is 
less rigid than that oﬀ ered by other scholars. Its ﬂ exibility, while a strength inas-
much as it allows us to more easily deal with a greater range of autonomous solu-
tions, is also an analytical weakness in that it allows greater subjectivity among 
observers. 112 By way of example, many of the area’s top scholars have certain non-
negotiable deﬁ ning points for “real” autonomy. For example, as noted elsewhere, 
Hannum demands,  inter alia , a “locally elected legislative body with some inde-
pendent legislative authority”, not subject to veto in its areas of competence, a 
locally selected executive and “an independent local judiciary”. 113 It is not clear 
how many, if any, autonomies truly meet this standard. While certainly these 
points are well taken and completely defensible from a legal form of analysis, it is 
also clear to observers that rigid standards exclude much of what we call auton-
omy, both in the territorial sense and otherwise. In this regard, American Supreme 
Court Justice Potter Stewart’s admonition regarding the deﬁ nition of obscenity is 
telling: “I’ll know it when I see it.” We know autonomous arrangements when we 
see them, and we would rather not exclude them because they fail to meet some 
rigid deﬁ nitional standard or other. Th e approach to forms of autonomy taken in 
this article is thus more inclusive, less rigid and, yes, admittedly less analytically 
objective. 
 6.3. Tier Two Issues 
 Tier two issues are not as inherently essential to legislative autonomy, and thus 
their absence is less damning to the conclusion that legislative autonomy exists. 
Th at said their presence adds further scope (aggregate numbers of issues covered) 
and may oﬀ er greater depth, depending on the analysis of the particular case. 
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Th e presence of multiple tier two issues and signiﬁ cant local control over these 
issues implies a relatively stronger form of legislative autonomy, as contrasted to 
fewer tier two issues and/or less local control which implies a weaker form of 
legislative autonomy, Th is section examines the following tier two issues: educa-
tion; local citizenship or domicile; symbols; who funds local government; whether 
or not local institutions can borrow money; local taxation; freedom from central 
taxation; management of revenue; the right to collect duties; internal security; 
local election rules; and who controls undeﬁ ned issues (the “catch all”). 
 Th e ﬁ rst set of tier two issues is the question of education. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, fewer legislative autonomy arrangements provide rules for education than 
one might expect. Of the cases presented here, only the Åland Islands, the Faroes 
and the Nunavut have education rights. In the Åland Islands, local education will 
be in Swedish. Presumably, local Swedish culture will also be part of this educa-
tion. 114 What is most impressive, however, is that Swedish-language education is 
available from day-care all the way up to the university. Of course, one must 
attend a mainland university either in Finland, Sweden or some other country. 
Th e Faroes have no university-level education available, but do have educational 
control from elementary school up through a teachers college. 115 In Nunavut, 
public schools are controlled and funded by the Nunavut government. Inuktitut, 
the language of the Inuit majority, is taught until grade four only. Nunavut also 
has college-level  education and some university programmes ( e.g. , nursing and 
Northern Teacher Diploma). Additionally, private religious schools may be pro-
vided for, with attendees contributing only to funding the private schools, and 
not public schools. 116 
 Th e next tier two issue is local “citizenship” or domicile, and how much it 
empowers the autonomy. 117 Only the Isle of Man, the Åland Islands and the 
Faroes have such citizenship. Th e Isle of Man and the Åland Islands both have 
signiﬁ cant local control concerning local citizenship, with real beneﬁ ts to the resi-
dents of each autonomous territory. In each locality, domicile or citizenship 
brings the right to vote and the right to practice one’s trade to the general exclu-
sion of non-domiciles. In the Åland Islands, there is the additional right to own 
real property which is limited to non-domiciles. 118 For the Faroes, mere residency 
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instead of local or regional citizenship simply allows eligibility for political oﬃ  ce, 
allows one to vote in local elections and allows for a special notation on one’s 
passport. 119 Th e Åland Islands retains the greatest local power followed by the Isle 
of Man. Residency in the Faroes provides no unique beneﬁ t. No other case of 
legislative autonomy examined here provides for special beneﬁ ts for domiciles, 
other than voting and oﬃ  ce holding rights. 
 Th e next tier two right concerns the right of the local region to have its own 
symbols, such as ﬂ ags or holidays. Here, the Faroes, the Isle of Man and the Åland 
Islands again are the only legislative autonomies with such local control. 
Th e Faroes, the Åland Islands and the Isle of Man all have a speciﬁ c right to ﬂ y 
their own ﬂ ags. 120 No other legislative autonomy of the cases studied here has 
such a right. Great scope and depth is demonstrated for the cases allowing local 
symbols, implying a “stronger” form of legislative autonomy. 
 Th e next tier two issue is who must fund the local budget. Th e Isle of Man, 
while it must pay for its own administration and services, contributes almost no 
funds to the United Kingdom, with the exception of a contribution to defence 
funding. 121 Th e Azores control their own regional budget. 122 Each of these exam-
ples demonstrates signiﬁ cant depth of local control. Th e Åland Islands have nearly 
as much depth of control over their budget (and, as we see below, greater control 
in some areas). Th e Åland Islands are provided funds from the centre each year 
depending on an agreed upon formula (the equalization amount). Extraordinary 
grants can also be provided for non-recurring expenditures within Åland’s com-
petence, 123 and, in addition, there is a local tax competence, which, however, has 
not been used with the exception of the local government tax. Th e depth of the 
Faroes and Nunavut budget control is less than that of the previous examples. In 
the case of the Faroes, the islands are responsible for paying for whatever 
 competencies they are granted. 124 While they have no responsibility for other 
expenditures, they also do not have the beneﬁ t of controlling such expenditures. 
In general, their budgetary competence is (and has been due to economic diﬃ  cul-
ties in the 1990s) more restricted than the previous examples. For Nunavut, the 
Commissioner (representing the centre) must recommend and approve spend-
ing. 125 Further, if the centre does grant funds, those funds can only be spent for 
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the designated purpose. 126 Clearly Nunavut has less ﬁ scal control than other leg-
islative autonomies, though still more control than non-legislative autonomies. 
 Management of revenues is also subject to varying degrees of local control. 
Th e Isle of Man seems to have the greatest degree of control over its funds in that 
the Court of Tynwald passes its own budget without UK input. Th e Azores also 
have control over the expenditure of locally raised revenues as well as revenues 
provided by the central state. 127 Th e Faroes, in contrast, have control only over 
locally generated funds. 128 Åland has great local control over expenditures and is 
not subject to state audits. Nunavut can spend money for local purposes, but the 
Governor in Council apparently must recommend such spending. 129 Th e other 
legislative autonomies make no mention of local control over the budget. 
 With regard to borrowing money, only the Åland Islands and Nunavut have 
such a right. However, Åland has far more local control over the issue than does 
Nunavut. In the Åland Islands, bond loans are allowed by local decision. 130 
Conversely, in Nunavut, approval of the Governor in Council is required, thus 
giving the centre control over whether or not Nunavut borrows money. 131 Th e 
accumulated debt must not exceed CAD 200 million. In comparison, however, 
no other legislative autonomy or non-legislative autonomy reviewed here may 
borrow money. 
 Taxation, of course, is related to ﬁ scal control. Th e Isle of Man, Nunavut, 
Åland, the Azores and the Faroes all have some right  to local taxation. Moreover, 
the Isle of Man and the Åland have diﬀ ering degrees of freedom  from central taxa-
tion. Th e Isle of Man raises its “own public revenue and” does “not receive subsi-
dies from or pay contributions to the UK”. 132 Nunavut has the right to direct 
taxation within the autonomous territory. 133 But because of its limited  population 
(about 30,000) and underdeveloped economy, it is heavily dependent on funding 
from the central Canadian government. Åland has the right to local taxes, and 
also receives contributions from the centre. 134 Th e Azores may tax as approved by 
the centre. 135 Th e Faroes have a right to local taxes, but not a local income tax. 136 
Hence, the autonomies appear to maximize local control on the Isle of Man, in 
Nunavut and in Åland. Th e Azores and perhaps also the Faroes seem to have 
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 relatively less control. Add to this the Isle of Man’s freedom from central taxes, 
and we see it having the greatest local control. Åland has slightly less local control 
because it pays central taxes, though a tax retribution (return) is automatic and a 
surplus added to that is possible if Åland pays more than 0.5 per cent over the 
average of the entire country’s tax (Finland). 137 
 One ﬁ nal way of raising money is by local duties. Nunavut has the right to 
certain licensing, including marriage, and such licensing presumably includes 
fees. 138 Åland has the power to legislate on the basis of the dues levied for Åland. 139 
Th e Faroes have the right to collect harbour duties. 140 
 Th e next tier two issue concerns local security. Th is can be a key issue where 
extreme distrust exists between the minority and the centre. But many of the 
cases at hand are not characterized by such levels of distrust, and therefore man-
agement of internal security is often a more minor issue. Th e Åland Islands prob-
ably have the most local control over internal security issues. Th ere, with certain 
exceptions for central perogatives and authority, the locals control internal secu-
rity. 141 In the Faroes, too, given that the centre has not explicitly retained control 
over internal security, it would appear that the acts of 2005 now grant control to 
the Faroes. 142 No other autonomy arrangements reviewed here make provision for 
local control over internal security. 
 It is also important to determine which entity shall control newly arising issues 
and whether the centre can cede issues to the periphery in the future, if their 
disposition has not been determined in the agreement. Th e Isle of Man essentially 
governs all matters except defence policy and foreign policy. When new areas 
come up, the Isle of Man will typically govern those as well, unless they are a 
function of international aﬀ airs. 143 Th e Faroes, too, under the 2005 legislation, 
have full control over all issues unless explicitly retained by the centre, of which 
there are only a few issues such as foreign and defence policy. In Åland, transfer 
of additional matters from a limited list of issues is allowed if both sides agree. 144 
In the Azores, the “Government of the Republic and the Regional Governments 
may agree [to] other forms of cooperation, particularly those involving acts of 
delegation of responsibilities”. 145 With certain exceptions, Article 165 of the 
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Portuguese Constitution sets forth those issues that may be delegated. 146 
In Nunavut, the local government can take control of additional issues as the 
Governor in Council designates, or under the NLCA as Canada and Nunavut 
Tunngavik Inc. agree. In either case, this represents the least amount of local 
control over this issue. 147 
 Th e ﬁ nal tier two issue concerns whether central or local authorities will have 
control over those issues not explicitly assigned (the “catch all” provision). As to 
the Faroes, since the 2005 acts all issues not explicitly retained by the centre are 
for the Faroese to control. 148 Th e Nunavut Act has a sort of hybrid provision, 
holding that all matters that are local or private will be controlled by locals, while 
all other matters are retained by the centre. 149 Finally, for the Åland Islands, the 
catch all provision is added to the list of competences of both the Legislative 
Assembly of the Åland Islands and the Parliament of Finland, which is a neutral 
arrangement in respect of issues not explicitly dealt with in the two lists of 
competences. 150 
 Within the tier two issues there are two points to note. First, the autonomy 
arrangements of the Isle of Man, the Faroe Islands, the Åland Islands and Nunavut 
come up repeatedly. Th ese are the legislative autonomies showing the greatest scope 
(or aggregate number of issues) covered. With regard to depth, the Isle of Man, the 
Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands seem to separate themselves from the other 
legislative autonomies. Again and again, the most extensive local control over tier 
two issues occurs in these autonomies. So while the tier one issues separated legisla-
tive autonomies from non-legislative autonomies, the tier two issues seem to distin-
guish between strong legislative autonomies and weak legislative autonomies. 
 6.4. Tier Th ree Issues 
 Tier three issues, the ﬁ nal tier to be examined herein in detail, typically revolve 
around international issues. Tier three issues include the ability to negotiate 
 international agreements covering only local aﬀ airs; the right to have input on 
international agreements; and the right to participate in regional organizations 
( e.g. , the European Union (EU)). 
 Only one legislative autonomy among those reviewed here has the ability to 
negotiate international agreements that are concerned with aﬀ airs totally under 
local control. Th e Faroes are entitled under the 2005 acts to “negotiate and 
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 conclude agreements under international law with foreign states and interna-
tional organizations … which relate entirely to subject matters under the jurisdic-
tion of the Authorities of the Faroes”. 151 Th is ability does not extend to security 
agreements which apply to Denmark, nor does it apply to “agreements which are 
to apply to Denmark or which are negotiated within an international organiza-
tion of which the Kingdom of Denmark is a member”. 152 It should be noted that 
the Faroese are also entitled to appoint representatives to Danish diplomatic mis-
sions “to attend to subject matters under the jurisdiction of the Authorities of the 
Faroes”. 153 More autonomies have limited input into international treaties involv-
ing the centre. 
 Th e greatest amount of inﬂ uence involves local representatives having input on 
international agreements to which the centre is a party. So, for example, post-1951 
treaties entered into by the United Kingdom are not binding on the Isle of Man 
unless it assents to them. 154 Of less depth, the Åland Islands can propose interna-
tional negotiations to the centre and has the right to be kept informed. It can also 
reject an agreement that aﬀ ects a local area of competence as to that local area. 155 
 An example of slightly less local control occurs when the local government is 
allowed to send representatives to international negotiations with the centre’s del-
egation where the issue aﬀ ects the periphery. For example, representatives of 
Åland are allowed to participate in international negotiations with the Finnish 
delegation “if there is a special reason for the same”. 156 Representatives of the 
Azores are entitled to “participate in the negotiation of international treaties and 
agreements that directly concern them”. 157 Th e rights above imply lesser rights as 
well, such as the right to provide non-mandatory consultations with the centre on 
issues aﬀ ecting the periphery. 
 Many of the cases examined herein are geographically located in or around 
Europe. Certainly the centre states are European states. Consequently, the interac-
tion of the autonomous areas with the EU is relevant. Th is interaction is also of 
interest because it may provide some precedent as to how other non-European 
autonomies might interact with regional and international organizations. Like 
many of the European autonomies, the Isle of Man has been granted a special rela-
tionship with the EU. Th e Isle of Man’s special relationship stems from Article 3 of 
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the United Kingdom’s Treaty of Accession to the European Community. Th is 
provides for the free movement of goods into and out of the Isle of Man, but not 
of people, services or capital. 158 Of course, this allows the Isle of Man to protect 
its small economy from certain forms of competition, yet reap the beneﬁ ts of free 
trade. Given the generally small size of the economies of the autonomies, states 
have often been willing to make such exceptions, at least on a temporary basis. 
Th e Åland Islands can force Finland to reveal those policy positions of the Islands 
that diﬀ er from Finland’s positions. Th e Åland Islands are also entitled to have 
contacts with the EU. But Åland may be held responsible for violations of EU 
obligations. Like the Isle of Man, the Åland Islands are not required to comply 
with EU rules on the free movement of people, thus providing some protection 
for the local workforce. Th e Åland Protocol governs the relationship between 
Åland and the EU. “Th e protocol is included in Finland’s Treaty of Accession and 
is thus part of the EU’s laws”, meaning it “cannot be altered” by the EU unless all 
members (27 as of July 2007) agree. 159 Åland retains special rights such as domi-
cile beneﬁ ts and tax exceptions. Azores representatives are entitled to “give their 
opinion … in matters that concern their speciﬁ c interests, on the deﬁ nition of the 
Portuguese state’s positions within the ambit of the process of constructing the 
European Union”. 160 Th is right includes “representation in European regional 
institutions and on delegations involved in European Union decision-making 
processes”. 161 Th ese powers demonstrate greater scope and depth of the autono-
mies of these particular territories. 
 Th ere exists a set of tier four issues that this article will identify but not analyze 
due to space constraints. Here we speak of the sorts of basic competencies that 
may be delegated to the local region. Th e issues include: municipal aﬀ airs; public 
works; health service; public welfare; public repositories; historical preservation; 
natural preservation; local transportation; agriculture; hunting and ﬁ shing; 
entertainment; intoxicant regulation; tourism; import/export controls; radio 
and television control; control of land; use of minerals; aboriginal claims; defence; 
international security agreements; and defence funding. 
 7. Conclusion 
 Th is article has argued that the autonomies examined in this volume’s set of case 
studies can be arranged on a spectrum of personal, cultural, functional, adminis-
trative and legislative autonomy. Th ere are three key variables on this spectrum: 
 158)   See Background Brieﬁ ng ,  supra note 48, Section 8. 
 159)  For the quote,  see Loughlin and Daftary,  supra note 4, p. 73, and in general  see pp. 33 and 73. 
 See also Act on the Autonomy of Åland,  supra note 49, Section 59. 
 160)  Constitution of the Portuguese Republic,  supra note 50, Article 227(1)(v). 
 161)   Ibid ., Article 227(1)(x). 
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scope of control (or aggregate number of issues controlled), depth of control 
(how great local control is) and distinctiveness of territory. When taken together, 
scope, depth and territory give us the total volume of autonomy. Legislative 
autonomy has greater volume than administrative autonomy, which has greater 
volume than functional autonomy, which has greater volume than cultural auton-
omy, which has greater volume than personal autonomy. Note that this says noth-
ing about the normative value of any particular autonomy. Rather, this article has 
attempted to visualize how much autonomy has been granted and then to label 
types of autonomy based on the amount of autonomy granted. Th is approach 
diﬀ ers from the more rigid approach taken by some scholars such as Hannum 
and Lapidoth. Given that Hannum and Lapidoth were among the ﬁ rst to system-
atically study the area, they have provided the initial deﬁ nitions that govern our 
understanding of autonomy. But as time has passed, as new forms of autonomy 
have been tried, as we have come to acknowledge that autonomy’s greatest value 
may be in its ﬂ exibility, it is apparent that a redeﬁ nition of our understanding of 
forms of autonomy is appropriate. Th is article attempts to give voice to that new 
understanding. 
